This note combines a dynamic industrial organization model, in which an industry is subject to exogenous processes of market-size and collusion structure, with a consumption-based asset pricing model for the shares in the industry's …rms. Three main …ndings emerge for our model under the assumption of informatione¢ cient asset markets. Firstly, the volatility of a …rm's share price is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry's market-size. Secondly, the volatility of a …rm's price-dividend ratio is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry's collusion structure whereby high (resp. low) ratios indicate less (resp. more) collusion. Thirdly, for non-volatile collusion structures the price-dividend ratio is constant across di¤erent collusion structures.
Introduction
Since a regulator has typically no direct information about an industry's collusion structure, it is standard for regulatory institutions to look at product-prices and pro…ts as possible indicators for collusion. 1 In the relevant case in which the regulator cannot directly observe the industry's demand ‡uctuations, however, the identi…cation problem arises whether changes in product-prices and pro…ts are rather caused by changes in the collusion structure or by changes in the industry's demand-side.
In this technical note we take the information-e¢ cient …nancial markets hypothesis (=EMH) seriously and ask the following question: Can a regulator learn the industry's collusion structure by simply observing publicly available …nancial market data such as the …rms'share prices and dividend-payments? To address this question, we develop a closed-form model of asset-pricing for the shares in a representative …rm that operates in an economic environment in which the industry's market size and its collusion structure are subject to exogenous stochastic processes. More speci…cally, we combine a gametheoretic model of an in…nite sequence of Cournot competition games with a Lucas (1978) type consumption-based in…nite horizon asset pricing model. The industry's demand-side is modelled through an exogenous stochastic process according to which the industry's market size growth rate is normally distributed. In the asset pricing model we stick to the standard assumptions (cf., e.g., Mehra and Prescott 1985) according to which the representative investor has a CRRA utility function and consumption growth is normally distributed. Compared to the existing asset-pricing literature, our model adds the new twist that a …rm's pro…t, i.e., dividend payments, is determined by the industry's market size as well as its collusion structure.
Under convenient (independence) assumptions on the joint distribution of the consumption growth-, the market-size-, and the collusion structure processes, three main …ndings emerge for our model:
1. The volatility of a …rm's share price is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry's market-size.
1 Bolotova, Connor and Miller (2008) o¤er a rare examination of the time series properties of prices before, during, and after cartelization (of the citric acid industry). The cartel initially controlled prices as well as quantities but competition from Chinese imports e¤ectively removed domestic incumbents' control over market prices. Data in Bolotova, Connor and Miller (2008) 2. The volatility of a …rm's price-dividend ratio is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry's collusion structure whereby less (more) collusion in any given period implies a higher (lower) price-dividend ratio for this period.
3. For time-invariant collusion structures the price-dividend ratio is identical across all di¤erent collusion structures.
According to these …ndings neither share prices nor price-dividend ratios for nonvolatile collusion structures are an indicator for an industry's collusion structure. However, whenever an industry's collusion structure is volatile, high (resp. low) pricedividend ratios are indicators for low (resp. high) collusion in this industry. While the above …ndings are obtained within a highly stylized theoretical framework, we hope that they might guide future empirical investigations that explicitly look at the relationship between volatile price-dividend ratios at …rm level, on the one hand, and di¤erent degrees of competition within the industry, on the other hand.
Cournot interaction with exogenous collusion structure
We construct an in…nite sequence of Cournot competition games that are subject to di¤erent market-sizes as well as di¤erent structures of industrial collusion over time. Both processes-the market-size process and the collusion process-are exogenous to the model in the sense that at each time period nature determines market-size and the collusion structure. That is, in contrast to typical models on collusion in the industrial organization literature we do not explicitly model collusion as a strategic choice of …rms. Rather we think of the exogenous collusion process as either caused by changes in exogenous political variables (e.g., cartel legislature or e¤ectiveness of the competition commission) or by changes in the …rms'management policies (e.g., ‡uctuations of CEOs with di¤erent appetites for risk or for empire-building).
Formally, we consider a …nite set of in…nitely lived …rms fA; B; :::g with # fA; B; :::g = n. Any partition of N is a collusion structure whereby S denotes the set of all possible collusion structures, (i.e., S collects all partitions of N ), with its cardinality given as the so-called Bell number 2 . I t 2 S denotes the collusion structure of the industry at period t with cardinality #I t . A member i 2 I t , i.e., some non-empty subset of …rms in fA; B; :::g, is called an alliance. Finally, de…ne by #i A : S ! f1; 2; :::; ng the function that counts for any given alliance I t 2 S the total number of …rms belonging to the same alliance as …rm A.
Example. Suppose that there are three …rms in the industry, i.e., fA; B; Cg. For n = 3 the cardinality (=Bell number) of S is 5 whereby I t #I t #i A 1 ffAg ; fBg ; fCgg 3 1 2 ffA; Bg ; fCgg 2 2 3 ffA; Cg ; fBgg 2 2 4 ffAg ; fB; Cgg 2 1 5 ffA; B; Cgg 1 3
De…nition. Consider the following period t Cournot-competition game G t = hS i ; U i i i2It such that, for all i 2 I t , S i = R + and U i :
where the market-size in period t, X t 0, stands for the linear inverse demand function's intercept.
According to the above de…nition, the alliances of collusion structure I t act as players who maximize their utility (=pro…t) within a simple one-period model of linear Cournotcompetition. In this game's unique Nash equilibrium s 2 S the pro…t of any alliance i 2 I t is given by
Observation 1. Under the assumption that the pro…t of any alliance is equally divided among its colluding …rms, the pro…t of …rm A is given as the adapted stochastic process
such that the random variable
is completely determined by the industry's collusion structure.
Remark. The industrial organization literature typically uses di¤erent models of strategic interaction in order to represent di¤erent degrees of competitive intensity. Namely, Bertrand interaction is used to represent more intense competition (low prices) whereas Cournot interaction represents softer competition (higher prices), (cf., e.g., Tirole 1988; Bester and Petrakis 1993; Bonanno and Haworth 1998) . While such interpretation is useful and natural when contrasting di¤erent industries, it is of rather limited use when analyzing dynamics within a given industry. In contrast, we de…ne the intensity of competition in terms of the number of alliances within that industry. In the extreme case where the number of alliances equals the total number of …rms in the industry, i.e., #I t = n, we have the most intensively competitive outcome, associated with low pro…ts. In the other extreme, i.e., #I t = 1, the entire industry forms one big alliance (i.e., a monopoly or cartel) corresponding to the least competitive case. Time variation in the number of such alliances, which we model as an exogenous stochastic process, determines the intensity of competition in the industry. In this sense, our de…nition of competitive intensity permits us to model variations in the intensity of competition within an industry over time.
The asset price equilibrium
By Observation 1, the period t pro…t (2) of …rm A is completely determined by the period t market-size X t and by the industry's collusion structure I t expressed through K t . In this section we derive a closed-form solution for period t asset prices of shares in …rm A. To this end we consider a consumption-based asset pricing model with an in…nitely lived representative investor who has in every time period perfect insider information about the Cournot industry; that is, the investor knows the market-size as well as the industry's collusion structure.
More speci…cally, we assume that the representative period t investor has standard additively separable CRRA preferences over future consumption streams such that for all s t U (C s ) = ln C s ,
where C s denotes the random variable for the consumption level in period s t. The representative period t investor chooses asset holdings x s in the …rm's shares for periods s t as the solution to the maximization problem max (xt;x t+1;::: );
where = e < 1 denotes the investor's time-discount factor and E t [U (C s )] denotes the investor's expected utility of period s consumption with respect to a conditional probability measure t taking into account the investor's information at period t. The budget condition is given by
where W s denotes (random) period s income not resulting from the asset's dividend payments and P s denotes the ex-pro…t asset price in period s. We further assume that the period s dividend payment Y s coincides with the period s pro…t of …rm A as given by (2).
The corresponding Euler equations-stating necessary …rst order conditions for equilibrium prices-are P t = E t M t;t+1 Y t+1 + P t+1 for t = 0; 1; :::
denotes the stochastic discount factor for s > t. It is standard to show that the above Euler equations-combined with a transversality condition requiring that lim s!1 E t [M t;s P s ] = 0-give rise to the following period t equilibrium prices for the asset
To derive a convenient closed-form solution to (7), we impose further structure on the three exogenous stochastic processes-(C t ) t 1 , (X t ) t 1 , and (K t ) t 1 -that drive our model. To this end de…ne the state space
and let C t , X t , and K t denote the corresponding coordinate variables. Denote by F t , t 1, the Borel -algebra on
and consider henceforth the probability space ( ; F; ) where F denotes the standard product algebra generated by all F t . Further suppose that the probability measure satis…es the following assumptions about the joint distributions of adapted stochastic processes.
Distributional assumptions.
(A1) The continuously compounded growth rates of consumption, i.e., g C;t such that e g C;t = C t C t 1 , are i.i.d. over time such that, for all t,
(A2) The continuously compounded growth rates of the market-size, i.e., g X;t such that e g X;t = X t X t 1 , are i.i.d. over time such that, for all t,
(A3) For all periods t, K t is independent of g X;t as well as i.i.d. over time. Furthermore, we make the-arguably strong-assumption that the covariance between the consumption-growth rate and the collusion structure is negligible, i.e., cov (g C;t ; K t ) ' 0.
Proposition 1.
(i) There exists, for all t 1, a period t equilibrium price function P t : ! R + if and only if
(ii) If there exists a period t equilibrium price function, then it is uniquely characterized by
Observe that any volatility of the equilibrium prices (9) is exclusively driven by the volatility of the market-size which is the only random variable on the r.h.s. of equation (9). Now substitute the identity
in (9) to obtain the following characterization of the equilibrium price-dividend ratio.
Corollary 1. The period t price-dividend ratio is given by
for ! 2 .
Whenever the collusion structure remains constant over time the price-dividend ratio is given as the constant
regardless of whether there is a lot or only little collusion in the industry. In contrast, if there is any volatility in the price-dividend ratio, then it must result from a volatile collusion structure whereby
Furthermore, since K t tends to increase 3 in the number of alliances #I t in period t, we obtain, by (11), that a …rm's price-dividend ratio tends to be high, resp. low, when there is less (resp. more) collusion in the industry. According to our model, a decrease (resp. increase) in price-dividend ratios indicates an increase (resp. decrease) in collusive behavior and vice versa. The economic intuition behind this …nding is straightforward: In times of high resp. (low) collusion, pro…ts (=dividend payments) are high (resp. low) whereas prices rather incorporate expected future pro…ts that take subsequent changes in the collusion structure into account.
Proof of Proposition 1
We start by proving part (ii) …rst. Assume for the moment that the transversality condition is satis…ed. Under the distributional assumptions A1-A3, we can then rearrange 3 In particular, for the benchmark case of alliances of the same size we have that K t = #i A (I t ) (#I t + 1) 2 is maximal if there is maximal competition (i.e., #I t = n, #i A (I t ) = 1) and minimal if there is minimal competition (i.e., #I t = 1, #i
the equilibrium price formula (7) as follows
For notational simplicity let g Z 2g X g C and observe that Finally, an application of the present value formula gives (9) whenever (8) holds. Ad (i). By the proof of part (ii), if there exists a period t equilibrium price function, then it is given by (7). In order to prove existence, it remains to be shown that the transversality condition is indeed satis…ed, i.e., lim s!1 E t [M t;s P s ] = 0 such that, for all s 1, P s is given by (7). Observe that That is, the transversality condition is satis…ed if and only if (8) holds.
